We develop a measure of the timing of industrialization, comparable across 149 countries. De…ning the year of industrial transition as the year in which employment in industry exceeded that in agriculture, we identify 67 countries that industrialized be- First, we …nd that an early transition is associated with higher income today. Second, the industrial transition is closely linked with the fertility transition. Third, early-and late-industrializers have rather similar levels of income, human capital, and structural composition. Fourth, late-comers di¤er from early-industrializers in terms of being more open to trade, having larger service shares, industrializing faster, experiencing higher growth rates of GDP per capita and schooling, and last by being more heterogenous along several dimensions.
Introduction
The Industrial Revolution transformed Britain from an agrarian society to the World's leading producer of manufacturing goods. It marks a turning point in World history. Before this event, living standards across the globe had been stagnant for thousands of years. 1 The transformation from agriculture to manufacturing spread from Britain to other Western economies and in its wake came sustained economic growth which lifted billions of people out of poverty.
These observations led many economists to argue that growth and industrialization are intrinsically linked. As a consequence, a vast theoretical literature seeks to understand the role that industrialization plays in economic development. 2 The empirical literature typically investigates the process of industrialization within one country (e.g., Michaels et al. (2012) ) or across a smaller group of countries (e.g., Bairoch (1982) , Duarte & Restuccia (2010) ). There are, to our knowledge, no studies investigating the spread of industrialization across the World.
The primary goal of the present paper is to establish a measure of the timing of the transition from agriculture to industry, which is comparable across countries and applicable to a large enough number of countries to draw valid conclusions. We argue that the year where the industrial labor force exceeds the agricultural labor force …ts the bill. In what follows, it is referred to as the year of the industrial transition or YIT.
Based on data from di¤erent sources, we identify 67 countries that have gone through an industrial transition between 1801 and 2005. We refer to these countries as industrialized. Our measure of industrial transitions coincides with dates argued by historians. We further cross-validate our measure using historical data on industrial production per capita available for 16 countries. Reassuringly, we …nd that the increase in industrial production is particularly rapid in the years just before and just after the year of the industrial transition.
The secondary goal of the paper is to exploit the YIT data to present facts which are useful in evaluating models of structural change. We do not claim to establish causality or provide de…nitive tests. Instead, we produce a number of correlations and plots which serve as a rough consistency check of several prominent theories of industrialization.
Most of these theories claim that there is a link between industrial transitions and modern economic growth. Our starting point is to investigate whether this conjecture is supported by the data. This leads to our …rst stylized fact:
1. Countries with early YITs are relatively richer today, whereas the richest non-industrialized today country has an income of around one third of the United States. Earlier transition to industry does not, however, linearly bring higher GDP per capita. For instance, countries that industrialized in the early 1900's enjoy the same incomes today as those that industrialized 50 years later.
We then examine the idea that the timing of the transition from a high-fertility regime to a low-fertility regime is related to the process of industrialization. This leads to the second stylized fact:
2. There is a positive and relatively tight and linear relationship between the timing of the industrial transition and the timing of the fertility transition. However, a group of Western European countries and European o¤shoots experienced the same low fertility patterns as the early industrializers, but yet did not industrialize until 50-100 years later.
To further investigate the anatomy of the industrial transition, we pick …ve variables suggested by the literature to be intrinsically linked to industrialization: income, human capital, trade, institutions, and structural composition (measured as employment share in services).
We examine these variables around the time of transition. The idea behind this exercise is illustrated by the following example. Suppose a theory posits that a certain level of human capital triggers industrialization. If there is some truth to this hypothesis, we would expect human capital to be relatively constant at the time of the transition across transitions in different countries and time periods. Many theories of industrialization implicitly claim that the key implicated variables behave uniformly across transitions. 3 There are also theories which explicitly assume that the process di¤ers over time. Kuznets (1973) argued that the unindustrialized countries in his time were fundamentally di¤erent from what the industrialized countries looked like prior to their industrial transitions.
By examining these variables (income, human capital, trade, institutions, and structural composition) around YIT, we claim to check the validity of the theories in question. Our …ndings are summarized in the third and fourth stylized facts:
3. Countries going through an industrial transition have a few things in common, independent of whether they industrialized 10 or 200 years ago: Roughly the same levels of income, levels of education, and share of the labor force in services. For instance, the average years of schooling in transitioning countries is usually close to 6. Hence, the data supports theories which predict that the level of human capital, income, and/or structural composition play key (and unchanged) roles in the transformation from agriculture to industry.
4. The latecomer di¤er from the early industrializers along the following dimensions: They industrialize faster and experience higher growth rates of GDP per capita and education at the time of transition, potentially due to technological catch-up: Late industrializers do not have to develop new technologies but can exploit those already developed by early industrializers.
Further, late industrializers are more open to trade and experience higher shares of the labor force employed in services. Last, the level of democracy does not seem to matter for industrialization; most countries lie in the tails of the polity2 index when they industrialize, i.e. being either full autocracies or full democracies.
The structure of the paper is as follows. Section 2 presents our measure of industrial transitions and validates it against historical data. Section 3 investigates the correlation between income today and the year of industrialization. In Section 4, we examine the relationship between the timing of the fertility transition and the timing industrial transition. Section 5 explores how uniform the process of industrial transitions is across time and space. Section 6 concludes.
3 See, e.g., Galor (2005) , Hansen & Prescott (2002) , Lucas (2009 ), Strulik & Weisdorf (2008 .
Dating industrial transitions
We measure the timing of the industrialization process as the year in which employment in industry exceeded employment in agriculture. We call it the year of the industrial transition, or YIT. Of course, the industrial transition does not happen from one year to the next. It is a gradual process, and YIT should be seen as a point in time that is useful for cross-country comparisons. One alternative to choosing a specifc date to mark the transition would be choosing two dates -a starting point and an end point of the transition process. Both such dates would be as arbitrarily chosen as the year where industry overtakes agriculture as a source of employment. We therefore prefer to associate the transition process with one single date, since it leaves us with just one judgement call to make. While agriculture is dominant in traditional low-income societies, both industry and the service sector are big employers in countries that have industrialized. One might therefore argue that if the aim is to analyze economic modernization, service sector employment should be treated similar to industrial employment. There are, however, reasons not to do so. The service sector spans everything from peddlers to brain surgeons. In fact, the service sector of Suriname is of the same size as that of Spain, but there is presumably less brain surgeons in the former. Consequently, in our baseline measure of YIT, we choose to disregard the service sector. As a robustness check, we calculate an alternative YIT de…ned as the year in which employment in industry and service combined exceeded that in agriculture (or in other words the year where agricultural employment falls below a certain fraction of total employment).
The correlation with the baseline measure of YIT is 0:94, indicating that our original series of YIT is robust to this change in de…nition. 
Validation
To check whether the year of industrial transition (YIT) as de…ned in this paper is indeed capturing af crucial point in the industrialization process, we compare it to a dataset of historical manufacturing output compiled by Bairoch (1982) . The dataset spans a relatively small subset of the countries in our sample (16 to be precise), and data is only available for 1800, 1860, 1913, 1928, and 1956 . In Figure 2 , these data points are plotted against the distance (in years) to YIT for each country. 10 Although the countries in the subsample have YITs ranging 
Industrialization and economic development
We will now use the YIT dataset to investigate various theoretical predictions from the literature on structural change. 11 Our analysis is based on a number of plots and correlations and we are not able to draw any causal inference from the evidence we present.
A popular narrative in the literature is that industrialization puts the economy on a path of sustained economic growth. 12 The implication is that the earlier a country goes through the industrial transition, the higher income it will enjoy today. Figure 3 shows that there is a
Excluding them yields an even better …t with our YIT data. 11 See, e.g., Hansen & Prescott (2002) , Galor (2005) , Strulik & Weisdorf (2008) , Lucas (2009) . 12 E.g., Kuznets (1973) , Lucas (2009) . signi…cant negative correlation between YIT and GDP per capita in 2005 for the 65 countries that transitioned over the period and for which we have current GDP data. The richest country which is not industrialized, Equatorial Guinea, has an income per capita which is about 1/3 of that of the United States. Moreover, the average income of the industrialized countries is more than …ve times larger than the non-industrialized countries.
13 This supports the idea that industrialization is linked with economic development.
The relationship between income today and year of industrialization is not entirely linear. 
Industrialization and the fertility transition
Historians have long noted a relation between the industrial and the demographic transition.
The demographic transition refers to the transition from high birth and death rates to low rates of both and has long been associated with the industrial transition. More recently, the so-called uni…ed growth models of Galor (2005) and Galor & Weil (2000) have formalized the idea that the fertility transition marks the point where the economy transitions from a stagnant Malthusian state to a sustained growth path. In the Malthusian state of the World, productivity improvements simply translated into larger populations, leaving productivity per capita unchanged. Although traditional uni…ed growth models do not model structural change explicitly, Galor (2005) points out that the demographic transition is often accompanied by an industrial transition. 14 Moreover, Strulik & Weisdorf (2008) and Vollrath (2009) the framework by incorporating structural transformation. According to these theories, the process of industrialization and the fertility transition should occur at roughly the same time. 
Income
According to some theories, industrialization occurs when the level of income passes some threshold. For instance, in the model by Murphy et al. (1989) , the presence of large …xed costs generates the potential for a pre-industrial trap with no or low growth. A big demand push is required to initiate a process of structural change. This theory predicts that industrialization should occur at roughly the same level of income per capita where domestic demand is large enough to instigate an escape from the trap. industrialization process with higher GDP growth rates. For countries industrializing before the 1960's, the average growth rate is 1.8%, ranging from the Netherlands who managed to industrialize with a GDP growth rate as low as 0.2% to France who industrialized with a growth rate of 3%. After 1960, the average growth rate nearly doubles to 3.3% and the variation nearly tripples. The fast growers are mainly European and Asian countries. Africa grows somewhat slower at the time of industrialization, but still faster than the earliest industrializers. This picture is consistent with a story of technological catch-up which would predict that latecomer , once they get on the path of industrialization, grow faster than the early industrializers. Caselli & Coleman (2001) and Lucas (2004) argue that human capital accumulation facilitates structural change. A central assumption is that the industrial sector is relatively more skill intensive implying that the return to education is higher and that educated labor tends to be placed in the industrial sector. The level of human capital is thus intrinsically linked to the allocation of labor between the industrial and the agricultural sector.
Human capital
If this idea has some general applicability, we would expect that the level of education is roughly similar across countries around the time of industrialization. To check whether this is the case, Figure A high level of education does not seem to be a su¢ cient requirement for industrialization, though. In fact, the country with the highest level of education in the sample (Sri Lanka) belongs to the set of non-industrialized countries. However, as expected, the countries with the lowest levels of education also belong to the group of non-industrialized countries.
The …gure also plots the average education level for the group of countries which are not industrialized in a given year. 18 Interestingly, this level increases over time, especially in the 17 The variance in years of schooling at YIT is 90% larger across the sample of 35 countries industrializing after 1960 than for the sample of 16 countries industrializing before 1960. 18 The data on education levels is available from Morrisson & Murtin (2009) from 1870 onwards. We calculate the average level of education across all non-industrialized countries from 1870 until they industrialized. Unfortunately, we are not able to make this exercise for the other correlates of industrialization, as these data are not available for enough countries su¢ ciently far back in time. Williamson (2011) points to yet another correlate of industrialization. He suggests that the latecomers may have been crowded out by the early industrializers via international trade. In particular, he shows that prices on manufactures in industrialising countries decreased while demand for primary commodities from the 'poor periphery'increased as a result of early industrialization. This incentivized the poor periphery to stick with agricultural production, hindering their industrialization process. An implication of this hypothesis is that industrialization among the latecomers could be facilitated by protecting infant industries by way of trade policy closure. That is, we would expect that the latecomers industrialize at lower levels of openness than the early industrializers. We check this by plotting openness at the time of 22 It could also cover the idea that the snapshot picture in Figure 9 might have been taken "too late". In other words, the seamingly rise in openness for latecomers could cover a low level of openness prior to industrialization, leading to industrialization as Williamson invisioned, which in turn increased openness. Under the latter interpretation, we would expect to see large increases in the change in openness around the year of industrialization among the latecomers. Figure 13 in Appendix A.3 shows that this is the case for some countries.
International trade

Institutions
Another potential determinant of economic development and industrialization is institutions.
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Here, we shed light on one aspect of institutions, namely the degree of democracy quanti…ed by the Marshall et al. (2010) Polity IV project. We choose this measure since it is widely used in the literature and available for many countries over a long time horizon. Figure 10 plots the polity2-index in the YIT against YIT. 24 The polity2 index ranges from -10 to 10 and measures the degree of democracy in a country, higher numbers indicating more democracy. Figure 10 shows that industrialization happens at various levels of democracy, though mainly either full democracy (near +10) or full autocracy (near -10). Part of this is a mechanic result of the fact that most countries lie in the tails of the polity2 range. Only 27% of the total sample lie within the midrange of -6 to +6 in year 2010. However, the 'midrangeshare'is larger for the countries that had not yet industrialized in year 2005 (41%) compared to 22 The increase in openness for late industrializers is consistent with the general trade boom over the period. 23 E.g., Acemoglu et al. (2001) , Acemoglu et al. (2002) , Dell (2010) , North (1990) , Engerman & Sokolo¤ (2000) . 24 The polity2-index data is available online from www.systemicpeace.org/polity/polity4.htm. the share of countries within this range at the time of industrialization (16%). In other words, it seems that lying in the tails of the polity2 index facilitates the industrialization process, independent of whether the state is democratic or autocratic. Again, it could also be the other way around: Having industrialized pushes the type of rule into the tails.
While Figure 10 does not seem to support a link between industrialization and a certain level of democracy, it is possible that other types of institutions are closer linked to industrialization.
Last, industrialization is not associated with major institutional changes and if any, the change is towards democracy (results available upon request).
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Structural composition
It has been widely acknowledged that the structural transformation that occurs with industrialization is a process where labor is …rst allocated from agriculture to industry and then later from industry to services (see e.g., the model by Duarte & Restuccia (2010) ). However, ?
show that within the last 25 years the pattern of structural change has been di¤erent for some developing countries. In particular, in a number of low-income countries in Africa and Latin America, labor has ‡oated from the agricultural sector into a low-productive service sector.
To investigate how homogenous the sequence of structural change is, Figure 11 plots the share of the labor force employed in the service sector at the time of industrialization against YIT. Except from a few Asian and Latin American countries, the service share in the YIT is relatively constant, which indicates some degree of uniformity in the process. Most countries industrialize with service shares around 40%.
The exceptions to this tendency of homogeniety are the four countries to industrialize …rst in this sample (UK, Belgium, Germany, and Switzerland) industrializing with service shares around 20% and at the other extreme lies a small group of latecomer industrializing with service shares well above 50%. Combined with the fact that the average service share of the non-industrialized countries equals the service shares at the time of industrialization, this suggests that, at least in a recent period, the path of structural change is not necessarily one where substantial increases in the share of the labor force in services only occur after industrialization.
The mirror image of Figure 11 shows the industry and agriculture labor force shares, which by de…nition are equal at the time of industrialization. While UK industrialized with more than 40% of the labor force employed in industry, Oman industrialized with less than 10% of the labor force being industrial workers. 
Speed of industrialization
To investigate how fast the typical industrial transition occurs, Figure 12 shows the increase in the ratio of industry to agriculture over the 20-year period around the YIT. An increase of one unit means an increase of 100 percentage points in the industry-to-agriculture ratio. Consider Germany, whose ratio changed by 100 percentage points around its industrialization year (year 1896). This covers a change from 82% being employed in industry relative to agriculture in year 1886 to 182% employed in industry relative to agriculture in year 1906. Figure 12 also reveals that the transition speed varies from country to country. For many economies, the increase is around 0.5, for others it is around 1.5 or higher. Furthermore, the slope of the regression line is positive and signi…cant, indicating that late industrializers, in general, transition faster. For instance, the earliest industrializer, United Kingdom, is also the slowest. One interpretation of this …nding is that early industrializers had to go through the time-consuming process of developing new technologies from scratch, whereas later industrializers could exploit those already developed, i.e., evidence of technological catch-up. Figure 12: Correlation between YIT and the change in the industry-to-agriculture ratio from 10 years before YIT to 10 years after YIT for 41 countries. The …tted line is the raw correlation between the two ( = 0:53***). A hollow dot indicates a data-break (UK industrialized in 1801). Colour coding according to continents: Oceania (blue), Africa (black), Europe (green), Americas (red), and Asia (yellow). Sources: own calculations, described in text.
Conclusion
History matters for current economic outcomes. The question is by how much and why?
Theoretical models have taken us some of the way, but to test the theories, comparable data on the particular historical outcome is necessary. We have focused our attention on one of the most important global events in modern history, namely the process that transformed societies from being mainly agrarian throughout most of history to relying mainly on industrial production.
While we are not able to draw any causal conclusions from the current analysis, we have gone some of the way by producing comparable data on the timing of industrialization for 149 countries across the globe. We de…ne the year of industrialization by the year in which employment in industry exceeds that in agriculture. This point in time marks the date where the political power, at least in democratic countries, tips in favor of industry. The numbers that we produce coincide with dates argued by historians and match the point in time where industrial output per capita surged.
With these data at hand, we are able to shed light on some stylized facts with relevance to the debate on why some countries industrialize before others and what this means for income today. We con…rm that countries that went through a process of industrialization earlier are richer today. In fact, the timing of industrialization explains 42% of the variation in GDP per capita today. Likewise, the industrial transition goes hand in hand with the demographic transition for most countries. We …nd signs of technological catch-up; the later industrializers industrialize at a faster rate and with higher levels of growth in GDP per capita and schooling than the countries that industrialized a century ago.
In support of various theories of industrialization, we …nd certain similarieties among the countries going through the industrialization process: Whether these countries industrialized 10 or 200 years ago, they seem to have roughly similar education levels, GDP per capita, and share of the labor force in services. The latter seems to be changing, though, with latecomers industrializing at much higher service shares than the early industrializers. Likewise for trade: Latecomers are markedly more open when going through the industrialization process compared to the 19 th century frontrunners. Further, there does not seem to be a link between industrialization and a certain level of democracy. Last, the diversity of industrializers along several dimensions is increasing over time.
Although the stylized facts are roughly consistent with several prominent theories, the data poses as many questions as it answers. With comparable cross-country data on the timing of the industrial transition we hope to leave future scholars better equipped for testing existing theories and developing new theories of the causes and consequences of structural change. 
A.2 Deindustrialization
16 countries in the sample experience deindustrialization over the period of analysis, listed in Table 4 . We have ruled out instances where multiple industrializations occur within 10 years. In these cases, it is likely that the reversal occurs as a result of measurement error, short-run shocks or other ‡uctuations in the economy not related to the long-run process of industrialization. 9 of the 16 countries industrialized in the past only but are not industrialized today. Armenia, Cuba, Georgia, Kazakhstan, Romania, and Ukraine were either allies or members of the USSR. They all deindustrialized during the 1990s following the dissolution of the Eastern Bloc. 
